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Abstract
Tests are a building block of our modern education system. Many tests are high-
stake, such as admission, licensing, and certification tests, that can significantly change
one’s life trajectory. For this reason, ensuring fairness in educational tests is becoming
an increasingly important problem. This paper concerns the issue of item preknowledge
in educational tests due to item leakage. That is, a proportion of test takers have access
to leaked items before a test is administrated, which leads to inflated performance on
the set of leaked items. We develop methods for the simultaneous detection of cheating
test takers and compromised items based on data from a single test administration,
when both sets are completely unknown. Latent variable models are proposed for the
modelling of (1) data consisting only of item-level binary scores and (2) data consisting
of both item-level binary scores and response time, where the former is commonly
available in paper-and-pencil tests and the latter is widely encountered in computer-
based tests. The proposed model adds a latent class model component upon a factor
model (also known as item response theory model) component, where the factor model
component captures item response behavior driven by test takers’ ability and the latent
class model component captures item response behavior due to item preknowledge. We
further propose a statistical decision framework, under which compound decision rules
are developed that control local false discovery/nondiscovery rates. Statistical inference
is carried out under a Bayesian framework. The proposed method is applied to data
from a computer-based nonadaptive licensure assessment.
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1 Introduction
Fairness in educational and other testing becomes an increasingly more important concern of
test score producers and consumers. Several test cheating scandals happened in recent years,
including the US college admissions scandal (Smith, 2019) and the UK English language test
cheating scandal (UK National Audit Office, 2019). In addition, item leakage of high-stake
tests is not uncommon (e.g., Jaschik, 2019; Kyle, 2002; Rosenblatt, 2018; Strauss, 2016).
Item pool plays an important role in most high-stake tests. In each test administration,
questions are selected from the pool. Due to the high cost of creating and calibrating new
items, questions in the item pool are typically used multiple times. This leads to the risk
of item leakage, which is one of the most common threats to test security (Kingston &
Clark, 2014). A proportion of test takers may receive access to the leaked items before the
test, possibly through a test preparation company, an online forum of test preparation, or
some other channels. These test takers will benefit from item preknowledge in the test. One
example is the GRE item leakage scandal in 2002. In that event, Educational Testing Service
found that many students in certain countries were benefiting from websites showing live
items of the GRE test. The proportions of beneficiaries and leaked items were so significant
that the average scores on GRE verbal increased by 100 points (out of a full mark 800 points)
in one country and 50 points in another (Kyle, 2002). Following the terminology of Cizek and
Wollack (2017), in what follows, we refer to test takers who benefit from item preknowledge
as cheaters and the corresponding items as compromised items.
The detection of item preknowledge has received much attention among quantitative
researchers in education. Many methods have been proposed to solve this problem (e.g.,
Belov, 2013, 2016; Romero, Riascos, & Jara, 2015; Shu, Henson, & Luecht, 2013; Sinharay,
2
2017a; van der Linden, 2009; van der Linden & Lewis, 2015), and three edited volumes
have been published, including Wollack and Fremer (2013), Kingston and Clark (2014), and
Cizek and Wollack (2017). However, there lacks a probabilistic model for item response data
involving item preknowledge. In addition, no suitable statistical decision theory has been
proposed for this problem where false decisions can sometimes result in serious consequences.
In this paper, we propose statistical methods for detecting item preknowledge in tests,
where both the cheaters and the compromised items are not known a priori. In particular, we
propose statistical models for data from a test with potential cheating behavior. We further
develop statistical decision theory for the detection of cheaters and compromised items.
Depending on the types of data that are available, two models are proposed, one for data
consisting only of item-level binary scores and the other for data consisting of both item-level
binary scores and response time. The latter degenerates to the former when response time
information is not collected. These two types of data are commonly available in traditional
paper-and-pencil testing and computer-based testing, respectively. As will be shown via our
real data analysis and simulation studies, incorporating response time information improves
the detection of cheaters and compromised items.
The first model can be regarded as a hybrid of two most popular models in the literature of
educational measurement, factor models and latent class models. Factor models are typically
referred to as item response theory (IRT) models in educational measurement. They serve
as the major statistical tool for item response theory, the dominant statistical paradigm for
the design, analysis, and scoring of tests (van der Linden, 2018). Many popular standardized
tests take the IRT paradigm. Following this practice, the proposed framework uses an IRT
model as a baseline model to characterize item response distribution when there is no item
preknowledge. In real applications, the same IRT model used by the testing program can be
chosen as the baseline model.
Latent class model is a family of models for learning the structure of unobserved groups
from data. They have also been widely used in educational assessment (Rupp, Templin, &
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Henson, 2010; von Davier & Lee, 2019) and community detection in social network analysis
(Holland, Laskey, & Leinhardt, 1983; Rohe, Qin, & Yu, 2016). In the current development,
a latent class model component is added upon a baseline IRT model to capture cheating
behavior due to item preknowledge. More specifically, we impose latent class structures on
both test takers (i.e., cheaters versus non-cheaters) and items (i.e., compromised versus non-
compromised items) and model their interactive effect on item responses. Thanks to this
special structure, the learning of the latent class structure in test takers and that in items
borrow information from each other.
When item-level response time information is available, a similar modeling strategy is
used to specify a joint model for item responses and response time. Specifically, we first take a
factor model as the baseline model for the joint distribution of item responses and response
time when there is no cheating. Such models have been developed in the psychometric
literature for the joint modeling of item responses and response time in standardized testing;
see e.g., van der Linden (2007). We then combine the baseline model with a latent class
model component to capture cheating behavior, where the interaction between the test-taker
classes and the item classes is reflected in the conditional distributions of item responses and
response time given the latent variables.
Making decisions for cheating detection can be very sensitive. Decisions on test takers
are a trade-off between false positive errors and false negative errors, where a false positive
error occurs when an innocent test taker being misclassified as a cheater and a false negative
error corresponds to a failure of detecting a cheater. The consequences of the two types of
errors are usually asymmetric and depend largely on the course of action taken following
the decision (see Skorupski & Wainer, 2017, for a detailed discussion). For example, a false
positive may be more severe if the test taker will be forbidden to take a liscensing test again
once being classified as a cheater, because such a decision may block him/her from taking
a certain career. For another example, a false negative may be more serious if a medical
student passes a medical board examination by cheating and becomes a surgeon. Decisions
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of removing potentially compromised items are also a trade-off between false positives and
false negatives, where a false positive corresponds to a noncompromised item being removed
and a false negative corresponds to a compromised item not being removed. The first type
of error results in a financial cost for new item development and the second type of error
threatens test fairness.
This problem can be viewed as a multiple hypothesis testing problem, where each test
taker/item is associated with a null hypothesis of the test taker not cheating/the item not
compromised. The two types of errors here are essentially the type I and type II errors
of hypothesis testing. False discovery rate (FDR) control provides a useful framework for
large-scale multiple testing when the number of hypotheses is large (Efron, 2012). This
framework leads to compound decision rules (Robbins, 1951; Zhang, 2003) for which infor-
mation on other hypotheses is taken into account in testing each individual hypothesis. Many
approaches have been developed under this framework, including the well-known Benjamini-
Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) and the local FDR control procedure
(Efron, 2004, 2008, 2012; Efron, Tibshirani, Storey, & Tusher, 2001), where the former is
a frequentist approach and the latter is developed under a Bayesian or empirical Bayesian
framework. In this paper, we take a full Bayesian framework and develop compound de-
cision rules based on the concepts of local false discovery rate and local false nondiscovery
rate (Efron, 2012). A Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm is developed for the
computation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose two statistical
models for cheating detection, one for item response data and the other for item response and
response time data. Under a Bayesian framework, statistical decision theory is developed
in Section 3 based on the proposed models. Bayesian inference procedures are developed
in Section 4. The proposed method is applied to a real dataset from a licensure test in
Section 5. We end with concluding remarks in Section 6. The supplementary material
contains the proof of a theoretical result, details of the proposed MCMC algorithms, and an
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extensive simulation study.
2 Proposed Cheating Detection Models
2.1 Cheating Detection based on Item Responses
We first consider detecting cheating based on item responses from a single test administra-
tion. Consider N individuals taking a test with J items. Let Yij be a random variable,
denoting test taker i’s response to item j. We consider binary scores, where Yij = 1 if
the corresponding response is a correct answer and Yij = 0 if it is incorrect. We denote
Yi = (Yi1, ..., YiJ) as the response vector of test taker i and denote Y = (Yij)N×J as the
response matrix. For ease of exposition, we assume the test is designed to measure a single
construct. We let θi be a person-specific parameter, denoting test taker i’s ability measured
by the test. In addition, we use a binary variable ξi to indicate whether test taker i is a
cheater, where ξi = 1 indicates cheating and ξi = 0 otherwise. Similarly, let ηj be another
binary variable, where ηj = 1 indicates that the item is compromised and ηj = 0 otherwise.
The cheating indicators impose latent class structures in both test takers and items. All the
θis, ξis, and ηjs are unknown and will be estimated from data, together with other unknown
parameters.
Baseline model. We first consider a baseline IRT model when there is no cheating, i.e.,
ξi = 0. For simplicity, here we adopt the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960) as the baseline model,
for which the item response function (IRF) takes the form
P (Yij = 1|θi, βj) = exp(θi − βj)
1 + exp(θi − βj) , (1)
where βj is known as the difficulty parameter which characterizes the difficulty level of the
item. Further assumptions on this baseline model will be discussed below when the proposed
model is formally described. We emphasize that the Rasch model can be easily replaced by
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other IRT models in the proposed framework, such as the two-parameter logistic model
(Birnbaum, 1968) and non-parametric IRT models (Ramsay & Abrahamowicz, 1989).
Proposed model We add an additional component upon the baseline IRT model given in
(1) to capture cheating, where cheating behavior is modeled by an interaction of the cheating
indicators ξi and δj. More precisely, we assume the following IRF
P (Yij = 1|Θi,∆j) := p(Θi,∆j) = exp(θi − βj + ξiηjδ)
1 + exp(θi − βj + ξiηjδ) , (2)
where δ is an additional positive parameter capturing the effect of cheating and Θi = (θi, ξi)
and ∆j = (βj, ηj) are taken as generic notations for the person- and item-specific parameters,
respectively. This model assumes that test takers who cheat will cheat on all compromised
items. Specifically, the IRF (2) goes back to the baseline model (1) if either the test taker i
is not a cheater (i.e. ξi = 0) or the item j is non-compromised (i.e. ηj = 0). In this situation,
the log-odds of a correct response is θi−βj. When the test taker is a cheater (i.e. ξi = 1) and
the item is compromised (i.e. ηj = 1), then the IRF still takes a Rasch form but the log-odds
of a correct response becomes θi − βj + δ, which is larger than the baseline by a positive
constant δ. Local independence is assumed; that is, Yijs are conditionally independent across
all test takers and items, given the drift parameter δ and all the person- and item-specific
parameters Θi and ∆j, i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., J .
We further adopt a Bayesian hierarchical latent variable modeling framework which as-
sumes that δ, Θi, and ∆j are all random variables. As we will see in Section 3, a com-
pound decision theory is established under this Bayesian framework. Specifically, we let Θi,
i = 1, ..., N , be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from distribution
g1(Θ|ν1) and ∆j, j = 1, ..., J , be i.i.d. samples from distribution g2(∆|ν2), respectively,
where g1 and g2 characterize the population of test takers and the domain of items, respec-
tively. Here, we assume both distributions are parametric and use ν1 and ν2 as generic
notations for the hyper-parameters of the two distributions, respectively. Figure 1 provides
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of model M1. The boxes are plates representing repli-
cates. The two outer plates represent test takers and items, respectively, and the inner plate
presents an item response.
a graphical representation of this model. This model is referred to as modelM1 in the rest.
The specification of g1 and g2, and the priors for ν1,ν2, and δ will be discussed in Section 4.1.
2.2 Cheating Detection based on Item Responses and Response
Time
We now extend the previous model to testing data consisting of both item responses and
response time. The proposed submodel for response time takes into account that a test taker
tends to answer more quickly when he/she has preknowledge about an item (van der Linden,
2009).
Baseline model. We start with a baseline model for the joint modeling of item responses
and response time. Let Tij denote the amount of time test taker i spends to answer item j
and T = (Tij) denote the response time matrix. The baseline model specifies the distribution
of (Yij, Tij) when there is no cheating.
For the modeling of response time, we introduce a parameter τi ∈ R as a person-specific
speed factor. A larger value of τi indicates that the test taker performs faster in general.
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More specifically, the following log-normal model is assumed as the baseline response time
model,
log(Tij)|τi, αj, κ ∼ N (αj − τi, κ) , (3)
where the item-specific parameter αj captures the mean time for completing the item in
log-scale and the variance term κ captures the variation in the response time across test
takers. In addition, the binary item responses Yij are still modelled with (1), assuming that
the distribution of Yij only depends on the parameters in (1), and does not depend on the
person- and item-specific parameters to be introduced in the conditional model for response
time.
In the baseline model, Yij and Tij are assumed to be conditionally independent given
θi, τi, βj, αj, κ, δ, and γ. The marginal dependence between Yij and Tij will be introduced by
the dependence between the ability and speed factors θi and τi, and the dependence between
the item characteristics βj and αj, details of which can be found in Section 4.1.
Note that this baseline model takes a similar form as the hierarchical model of van der
Linden (2007) for the joint modeling of item responses and response times. The response
time submodel (3) can be easily generalized (e.g., Loeys, Rosseel, & Baten, 2011; van der
Linden, 2007; Wang, Chang, & Douglas, 2013).
Proposed model. The proposed model based on item responses and response time is an
extension of modelM1 and it degenerates toM1 when response time information is missing
completely at random. Specifically, the same IRF as in (2) is assumed. In addition, on the
basis of baseline model (3), we introduce the submodel for response time
log(Tij)|τi, ξi, αj, ηj, γ ∼ N (αj − τi − ξiηjγ, κ) , (4)
where ξi and ηj are the cheating indicators for test takers and items, respectively, and γ is
a positive drift parameter, characterizing the reduction in time due to item preknowledge.
9
If either the test taker i is not a cheater (i.e. ξi = 0) or the item j is non-compromised (i.e.
ηj = 0), then both the item response submodel and the response time submodel degenerate
to the corresponding baseline models. On the other hand, when the test taker is a cheater
(i.e., ξi = 1) and the item is compromised (i.e., δj = 1), the mean log-time reduces to
αj − τi − γ and the log-odds of a correct response increases to θi − βj + δ. Note that the
item response submodel and the response time submodel share the same cheating indicators
ξi and ηj. Local independence is assumed, which says that the 2NJ random variables Yij,
Tij, i = 1, ..., N, j = 1, ..., J , are conditionally independent, given δ, γ, κ, and all the person-
and item-specific parameters, (θi, ξi, τi) and (βj, ηj, αj), j = 1, ..., J , i = 1, ..., N .
With slight abuse of notation, we still use Θi and ∆j to denote the person- and item-
specific parameters, respectively, with Θi = (θi, ξi, τi) and ∆j = (βj, ηj, αj). A hierarchical
modeling framework is still adopted, in which δ, γ, κ, Θi, and ∆j are regarded as random
variables. We assume Θi, i = 1, ..., N , are i.i.d. and ∆j, j = 1, ..., J , are i.i.d., following two
distributions, respectively. With more abuse of notation, we denote the two distributions by
g1(Θ|ν1) and g2(∆|ν2) and use ν1 and ν2 as the generic notations for the hyper-parameters
in the model. This model is visualized in Figure 2 and is referred to as model M2 in the
rest. The specification of g1 and g2, and the priors for ν1,ν2, δ, γ, and κ for this model will
be discussed in Section 4.1.
2.3 Related Models and Extensions
Our problem can be viewed as an outlier detection problem for multivariate data, when
viewing cheaters and compromised items as outliers. From this perspective, the goal is to
simultaneously detect outliers in rows and columns of a N × J data matrix. The proposed
models can be viewed as an extension of the mean-shift model for outlier detection and
robust estimation in regression setting (Kong, Bondell, & Wu, 2018; McCann & Welsch,
2007; She & Owen, 2011) to a non-linear factor model setting.
The proposed model is also closely related to mixed Rasch models (Rost, 1990; Rost
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of model M2. The boxes are plates representing repli-
cates. The two outer plates represent test takers and items, respectively, and the inner plates
presents an item response and response time.
& von Davier, 1995), a hybrid of the Rasch model and latent class models. The major
difference between the proposed model and the mixed Rasch model is that the latter only
assumes latent classes in test takers while the proposed model imposes latent class structures
in both test takers and items. As a result, the proposed method allows us to simultaneously
detect cheaters and compromised items, while the former does not.
We further remark that the proposed modeling framework is quite general, though specific
forms are assumed in modelsM1 andM2. The key idea is to impose latent class structures
on both test takers and items, on top of a factor model for capturing normal item response
behavior. Taking this idea, the baseline models in M1 and M2 can be easily replaced by
more complex models, as discussed previously. The proposed model can also be extended
to testing data with polytomous item-level scores or tests designed to measure multiple
constructs. The former can be handled by replacing the baseline IRT model by IRT models
for polytomous items (see e.g., Chapter 5, Bartholomew, Knott, & Moustaki, 2011) and the
latter can be handled by specifying a multidimensional IRT model (Reckase, 2009) as the
baseline model.
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Finally, we point out that the latent class component for cheating can be further gener-
alized. In the current models, a test taker either has preknowledge on all the compromised
items or none of the compromised items. In addition, the effect of cheating is assumed to
be the same across different cheaters and compromised items, characterized by parameters
δ and γ in the item response submodel and the response time submodel, respectively. These
assumptions can be generalized. For the former, we may consider multiple latent classes
for cheaters and compromised items, respectively, when there are multiple “sources” of item
leakage and cheaters may have access to one or multiple sources of leaked items. For the
latter, it is possible to allow δ and γ to be person- and/or item-specific under a Bayesian
hierarchical latent variable modeling framework.
3 Statistical Decision Theory for Cheating Detection
Making formal decisions in cheating detection is often sensitive and high-stake. In what
follows, we provide a statistical decision framework that takes into account the special fea-
tures of the problem. Under a full Bayesian framework, the proposed decision rules rely on
the posterior probabilities of the cheating indicators, ξi and ηj. For real-life problems where
both N and J are large, these posterior probabilities cannot be computed analytically. In
that case, we make decision based on approximated posterior probabilities given by MCMC
samples.
3.1 Bayesian Decision for Cheater Detection
We denote Di as the decision on test taker i, where Di = 1 means flagging the test taker as
a cheater and Di = 0 otherwise. Then a false positive happens when Di = 1 and ξi = 0 and
a false negative happens when Di = 0 and ξi = 1. As mentioned previously, decisions on the
detection of cheaters involve trade-off between these two types of errors, whose importance
is usually asymmetric. Suppose the relative cost of a false positive is $ ∈ (0, 1) and that of
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Not flagged as cheater Flagged as cheater Total
Noncheater N00 N01 N0·
Cheater N10 N11 N1·
Total N·0 N·1 N
Table 1: A summary of the outcome of detecting cheaters.
a false negative is 1−$, then the Bayes risk becomes
R(Di) = $P (Di = 1, ξi = 0) + (1−$)P (Di = 0, ξi = 1). (5)
Following Bayesian decision theory, the optimal decision rule which minimizes the Bayes risk
is to classify based on the posterior distribution. That is, under model M1, we should let
Di = 1 if P (ξi = 1|Y) ≥ $, and under modelM2, we should let Di = 1 if P (ξi = 1|Y,T) ≥
$.
3.2 Compound Decision for Cheater Detection
In practice, however, the relative costs of false positive and false negative are usually hard to
specify. An alternative is to make a compound decision based on information from all test
takers. We consider the situation where the consequence of false positives is more severe than
that of false negatives. Given a decision rule, the results can be summarized by Table 1, where
N00, N01, N10, and N11 denote the numbers of true negative, false positive, false negative, and
true positive, respectively. Then one quantity that the decision maker would like to control
is the false positive proportion N01/max {N·1, 1}, which is the proportion of innocent test
takers among the detections. The denominator is chosen so that this proportion is well-
defined even when N·1 = 0. For ease of exposition, the following discussion is under model
M1, but it easily extends to modelM2 by replacing the posterior distributions P (ξi = 1|Y)
by P (ξi = 1|Y,T).
We formalize this idea by controlling a local False Discovery Rate (FDR), which is defined
13
as the posterior expectation of the false positive proportion; see Efron (2008) for a detailed
discussion. Specifically, we consider a specific family of decision rules, for which the decision
on each test taker i is given by thresholding the posterior probability, i.e.,
Di(ζ) = 1{P (ξi=1|Y)>ζ}, (6)
for some threshold ζ. Following our previous discussion, this decision is an optimal individual
decision that minimizes Bayesian risk (5), when the relative cost of false positive is ζ. Under
the full Bayesian setting and given threshold ζ, the local FDR becomes
fdrζ(Y) =
∑N
i=1Di(ζ)P (ξi = 0|Y)
max {∑Ni=1Di(ζ), 1} , (7)
which only depends on the posterior probabilities P (ξi = 1|Y), i = 1, ..., N . The local
False Nondiscovery Rate (FNR), which is defined as the posterior mean of N10/N·0, can be
obtained similarly
fnrζ(Y) =
∑N
i=1(1−Di(ζ))P (ξi = 1|Y)
max {∑Ni=1(1−Di(ζ)), 1} .
Then the optimal ζ is given by the following proposition that controls the local FDR to be
below a certain pre-specified level ρ (e.g., ρ = 1%) and in the meantime minimizes the local
FNR.
Proposition 1. Given data matrix Y, the local FDR fdrζ(Y) as a function of ζ is nonin-
creasing and left continuous, and the local FNR fnrζ(Y) is nondecreasing in ζ. Then
ζ∗(Y; ρ) = inf{ζ : fdrζ(Y) ≤ ρ} (8)
solves the optimization
min
ζ
fnrζ(Y), s.t. fdrζ(Y) ≤ ρ. (9)
In other words, given a model and item response matrix Y, the optimal decision which
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solves (9) is Di(ζ
∗(Y; ρ)), i = 1, ..., N , among the class of decision rules (6). The proof of
this proposition is given in Appendix A.
We remark that an alternative criterion to false discovery rate control is familywise error
rate control, which tends to be more conservative. For educational tests with thousands or
even hundreds of thousands of test takers, the controlling of familywise error rate can result
in extremely low detection power, making it less useful in practice. On the other hand, the
false discovery rate control criterion is more scalable to tests of different sizes.
Similar as above, if false negatives have a more significant consequence than the false
positives, then a better idea may be to control the local FNR to be below a certain level
and in the meantime to minimize the local FDR. As the definitions of local FDR and local
FNR are mathematically symmetric, the procedure described above can be easily modified
for this criterion.
3.3 Detection of Compromised Items
Decisions also need to be made for items. When there is sufficient evidence suggesting that
an item is compromised, then we want to remove it from the item pool to maintain the
quality of the pool. As mentioned earlier, this decision problem faces the trade-off between
the financial cost for item pool replenishment and the need of maintaining the quality of the
item pool. We make two remarks.
First, the Bayesian decision framework is still suitable here for handling the trade-off.
Similar as in Section 3.1, by setting relative costs of a false positive (i.e., a noncompromised
item flagged as compromised) and a false negative (i.e., failing to flag a compromised item),
a Bayes risk can be defined and the corresponding optimal decision can be obtained based
on the posterior distribution P (ηj = 1|Y) under model M1 or P (ηj = 1|Y,T) under model
M2.
Second, compound decision rule can also be developed. Here, a false negative error results
in the use of a leaked item in tests, which tends to be more detrimental than a false positive
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one for the testing industry. It is thus sensible to control the false negative proportion
which is the proportion of compromised items in the remaining ones. Then similar to the
developments in Section 3.2, local FDR and local FNR can be defined for the compound
decision on items and a similar procedure can be developed that controls local FNR to be
below a given threshold (e.g., 1%) and in the meantime minimizes the local FDR.
4 Bayesian Inference
4.1 Prior and Hyper-prior Specification
Prior and hyper-prior specification for model M2. As model M1 can be viewed
as a submodel of M2, we only need to specify the priors and hyper-priors for model M2.
The priors and hyper-priors for modelM1 can be obtained by marginalizing out the unique
parameters in M2.
We start with the specification of g1, the joint distribution of Θi = (θi, ξi, τi). First, it
is assumed that (θi, τi) follows a bivariate normal distribution N(0,Σ), where Σ = (σij)2×2.
Second, we let the cheating indicator ξi be independent of (θi, τi) and follow a Bernoulli
distribution, Bern(pi1). Note that a person’s ability and speed are typically correlated, which
is why we assume a bivariate normal distribution for (θi, τi). Similar settings are adopted in
existing models for item responses and response time; see e.g., van der Linden (2007).
We then specify g2, the joint distribution of ∆j = (βj, ηj, αj). Similar to that of g1,
we first let (βj, αj) follow a bivariate normal distribution N(µ,Ω), where µ = (µ1, µ2) and
Ω = (ωij)2×2. We further assume that ηj is an independent Bernoulli random variable,
Bern(pi2).
It remains to specify the prior for positive parameters δ, γ, κ, as well as the priors for
hyper-parameters pi1, pi2, µ1, µ2, Ω, and Σ.
1. As δ is positive, we assume a Gamma distribution with shape parameter 2 and rate
parameter 0.5, Gamma(2, 0.5).
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2. Similarly, γ is assumed to follow the same Gamma distribution, Gamma(2, 0.5).
3. κ is assumed to follow an inverse Gamma distribution, IG(1, 1), where the shape and
scale parameters are both set to 1.
4. pi1 and pi2 are assumed to be i.i.d., following a beta distribution with both shape
parameters being 2, Beta(2, 2).
5. µ1 and µ2 are assumed to be i.i.d., following a normal distribution N(0, 5
2).
6. Σ and Ω are assumed to be i.i.d., following an inverse Wishart distribution where the
scale matrix, IW(Ψ, ν),
Ψ =
 2 0
0 2

and the degree of freedom ν = 3. Under this prior distribution, σ11, σ22, ω11, and ω22
marginally follow an inverse Gamma distribution IG(1, 1).
This completes the specification of the priors and hyper-priors for model M2.
Induced priors and hyper-priors for modelM1. The priors and hyper-priors for model
M2 induce priors and hyper-priors for modelM1. In what follows, we list the induced priors
and hyper-priors for model M1.
1. For Θi = (θi, ξi), θi and ξi are independent, following normal distribution N(0, σ11)
and Bernoulli distribution Bern(pi1), respectively.
2. Similarly, for ∆j = (βj, ηj), βj and ηj are independent, following normal distribution
N(µ1, ω11) and Bernoulli distribution Bern(pi2), respectively.
3. δ follows a Gamma prior, Gamma(2, 0.5).
4. pi1 and pi2 are i.i.d., following Beta(2, 2).
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5. µ1 follows a normal distribution N(0, 5
2).
6. σ11 and ω11 are i.i.d. IG(1, 1).
This completes the specification of the priors and hyper-priors for model M1.
4.2 Bayesian Inference
Computation. Statistical inference is carried out under a full Bayesian setting. A random
scan Metropolis-Hastings (MH) within Gibbs MCMC algorithm is developed under both
models for sampling the unknown parameters from their joint posterior distribution1. The
details of this MCMC algorithm are given in Appendix B. For a specific model (M1/M2),
the posterior distributions of ξi and ηj are approximated by the posterior samples, based on
which statistical decision procedures described in Section 3 are implemented.
Comparison of models. We further address the following questions by model comparison.
Does our item response data show evidence of cheating? If so, does item response time
information help detect cheating?
We address the first question by comparing model M1 with a null model, where the
null model is the same as model M1 except for assuming a baseline IRF (i.e., ξi = 0 and
δj = 0, for all i and j). This null model is referred to as modelM01 in the rest. We compare
the two models by the deviance information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, &
Van Der Linde, 2002), which can be easily computed using MCMC. If M1 is preferred to
M01, then it implies that a baseline IRT model is not sufficient and cheating due to item
preknowledge is likely to exist in the data.
To address the second question, we compare modelM2 with a null model which has the
same specification as model M2 except that its submodel for response time is a baseline
1An R package is developed for the estimation of models M1 and M2. The R-package will be made
publicly available online upon the acceptance of the paper.
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model without a cheating component. That is, in the null model,
log(Tij)|τi, ξi, αj, ηj, γ ∼ N (αj − τi, κ) .
This null model is referred to as modelM02 in the rest. If modelM2 is preferred to the null
model, it suggests that response time contains information about the cheating indicators and
thus incorporating response time information should facilitate cheating detection. Again, we
use DIC for model comparison.
5 Case Study: Credentialing Dataset
We apply the proposed method to a dataset from a computer-based non-adaptive licensure
test. This dataset has also been analyzed in several chapters of Cizek and Wollack (2017)
and journal articles including Sinharay (2017a) and Sinharay (2017b). The test contains 170
binary-scored items (J = 170), for which test takers’ item responses and response time are
available. The dataset is preprocessed by removing test takers with zero response time in
one or multiple items. This leads to a final dataset containing 1624 test takers (N = 1624).
The testing program flagged 41 among the 1624 test takers as likely cheaters, through a
combination of data analysis and a careful investigative process which brought in other
pieces of information. By a similar investigation process, the testing program also believed
that 64 among the 170 items were compromised. These labels will be used as partial truth
for validating our data analysis results, though they are not directly incorporated into our
model. It is worth noting that these labels are not the ground truth and it is very likely
that a substantial proportion of cheaters and compromised items were missed by the testing
program.
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Figure 3: Descriptive analysis of credentialing dataset. Panel (a): Histogram of test takers’
total scores by the testing program’s cheating labels. Panel (b): Histogram of items’ correct
rates by the testing program’s compromisation labels.
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
We start with descriptive analysis results to give an overview of the dataset. Panel (a) of
Figure 3 shows the histogram of test takers’ total scores by the testing program’s cheating la-
bels. Similarly, Panel (b) of Figure 3 gives the histogram of items’ correct rates by the testing
program’s compromisation labels. Similarly, the two panels of Figure 4 show the histograms
of mean response time in the logarithm scale for test takers and items, respectively.
From these plots, it is not difficult to see that the corresponding summary statistics do not
have much information about the labels of the test takers and items. In fact, the area under
the curves (AUC) of the corresponding ROC curves are 55.2% and 71.7% for the classification
of the cheating labels based on total score and mean log-time, respectively. Similarly, the
corresponding AUCs for the classification of items are 52.4% and 60.6%, respectively. As we
will see in the sequel, the proposed models substantially improve upon these benchmarks.
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Figure 4: Descriptive analysis of credentialing dataset. Panel (a): Histogram of test takers’
mean log-time by the testing program’s cheating labels. Panel (b): Histogram of items’ mean
log-time by the testing program’s compromisation labels.
5.2 Detection based on Item Responses
We apply model M1 to the item responses in the dataset. Using the algorithm given in
Appendix B, 100 MCMC chains were run with random starting points. Their convergence
was assessed by traceplots and the Gelman and Rubin diagnostic statistic (Gelman & Rubin,
1992). Among the 100 chains, 13 chains converged and Figure 5 shows the traceplot of
deviance for these chains after their convergence. The rest of the chains failed to converge
after 13,000 iterations and thus are not used in our analysis. Note that slow mixing is a
common issue for MCMC algorithms when there are discrete parameters (e.g., Richardson
& Green, 1997), especially when the number of discrete parameters is large.
Inference is drawn based on 65,000 posterior samples from the 13 converged chains, where
each chain contributes 5,000 samples. We first compare modelsM1 andM01 by DIC. Recall
that the null modelM01 only assumes a baseline IRT model that does not contain a cheating
component. The DIC value for model M01 is also based on 65,000 posterior samples from
an MCMC algorithm. The DIC values for the two models are 281,052.3 and 283,320.1
respectively. The smaller DIC for model M1 suggests that item preknowledge is likely to
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Figure 5: Applying modelM1 to credentialing dataset: The traceplot of deviance for one of
the 13 converged chains.
exist among the test takers.
We then examine the classification results. Panel (a) of Figure 6 gives the boxplots of
the posterior means of ξi for the cheating and non-cheating groups (defined by the testing
program), respectively. As we can see, the posterior means of ξi for the cheating group tend
to be close to 1 and those for the non-cheating group tend to be close to 0, with a small
number of exceptions. Panel (b) of Figure 6 gives boxplots of the posterior means of ηj for
the compromised and non-compromised items, respectively. Similarly, the posterior means of
ηj for the compromised items tend to be close to 1 and those for the non-compromised items
tend to be close to 0. The corresponding ROC curves for the classification of the cheating
and compromisation labels are presented in Figure 7. The AUCs for these two ROC curves
are 0.917 and 0.846, respectively. They are substantially larger than the ones given by the
summary statistics discussed in Section 5.1.
Moreover, Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows the local FDR and the local FNR as functions of
the number of detections, respectively, when applying the proposed compound decision rule
to test takers. As we can see, as the number of detections increases, the local FDR increases
and the local FNR decreases. The same plot for items is given in Panel (b) of Figure 8.
Specifically, the numbers of detections under different thresholds are given in Table 2, where
we control local FDR for test takers and control local FNR for items.
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Figure 6: Applying modelM1 to credentialing dataset. Panel (a): Boxplots of the posterior
means of ξi for the cheating and non-cheating groups (defined by the testing program). Panel
(b): Boxplots of the posterior means of ηj for the compromised and non-compromised items
(defined by the testing program).
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Figure 7: Applying model M1 to credentialing dataset. Panel (a): ROC curve for the
classification of cheaters (labeled by the testing program) by the posterior means of ξi.
Panel (b): ROC curve for the classification of compromised items (labeled by the testing
program) by the posterior means of ηj.
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Figure 8: Applying model M1 to credentialing dataset: The local FDR and the local FNR
as functions of the number of detections.
1% 5% 10%
Test takers 12 36 49
Items 94 82 68
Table 2: Applying model M1 to credentialing dataset. The first row shows the numbers
of detections for test takers, when controlling the corresponding local FDR at 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. The second row shows the numbers of detections for items, when
controlling the corresponding local FNR at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Finally, posterior means and 95% credible intervals of the global parameters are presented
in Table 3, where the global parameters refer to the parameters that are not person-specific
or item-specific. In particular, the posterior mean of the proportion of cheaters is 2.1%, with
95% credible interval (1.9%, 3.2%). This estimate is close to the proportion of 2.5% based
on the cheating labels from the testing program. The posterior mean of the proportion of
compromised items is 40.5%, with 95% credible interval (36.9%, 43.7%). This estimate is
close to, but slightly higher than the proportion of 37.6% given by the testing program. It
suggests that the testing program may have missed several compromised items during its
labeling process. Furthermore, the posterior mean of δ is 0.904. That is, the odds ratio
of correctly answering a compromised item is about exp(0.904) = 2.5 when comparing a
cheater and a non-cheater with the same ability level.
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σ11 pi1 pi2 ω11 µ1 δ
EAP 0.274 0.021 0.405 0.704 -0.984 0.904
95% CI (0.256, 0.304) (0.019, 0.032) (0.369, 0.437) (0.691, 0.879) (-1.133, -0.864) (0.745, 1.102)
Table 3: Applying model M1 to credentialing dataset. The row labelled “EAP” shows the
posterior means of the global parameters, where EAP represents for Expected A Posteriori,
and the row labelled “95% CI” provides the corresponding 95% credible intervals.
5.3 Detection based on Item Responses and Response Time
We further apply model M2 to the dataset consisting of both item responses and response
time. We ran 13 MCMC chains, for which the starting points for theM2 unique parameters
were chosen randomly and the common parameters shared with modelM1 were taken from
the mixed chains for modelM1 above. All the 13 chains converged after 13,000 steps based
on the same convergence criteria as above.
Similar as above, inference is drawn based on 65,000 posterior samples from the 13 chains
after convergence. We compare model M2 and the corresponding null model M02 by DIC,
where a cheating component is included in the item response submodel of M02 but not in
its response time submodel. The corresponding DIC values are 7,285,763 and 7,314,248,
respectively. The smaller DIC for modelM2 suggests that response time is likely to contain
information about the cheating behavior in this test.
The classification results are similar to those from modelM1 and thus some plots shown
above are omitted here. In particular, the ROC curves based on the posterior means of ξi
and ηj have AUC 0.938 and 0.854, respectively, where these AUC values are slightly higher
than those from modelM1. In addition, the numbers of detections for test takers and items
are shown in Table 4, where we still control local FDR for test takers and control local
FNR for items. Comparing the results in Tables 2 and 4, more detections tend to be made
under the model M2. This is likely due to that the posterior distributions tend to be more
concentrated under model M2 as it utilizes more information.
Posterior means and 95% credible intervals for the global parameters of model M2 are
presented in Table 5. Comparing Tables 3 and 5, we find that the estimates of the common
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1% 5% 10%
Test takers 14 37 52
Items 102 88 76
Table 4: Applying model M2 to credentialing dataset. The first row shows the numbers
of detections for test takers, when controlling the corresponding local FDR at 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. The second row shows the numbers of detections for items, when
controlling the corresponding local FNR at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
σ11 pi1 pi2 ω11 µ1 δ
EAP 0.287 0.024 0.423 0.756 -0.914 1.019
95% CI (0.259, 0.298) (0.019,0.032) (0.378, 0.469) (0.694, 0.778) (-1.139,-0.807) (0.894, 1.132)
σ22 σ12 ω22 ω12 µ2 γ
EAP 0.270 0.123 0.397 0.104 -0.568 0.615
95% CI (0.246, 0.312) (0.091, 0.138) (0.334, 0.427) (0.078, 0.122) (-0.873, -0.325) (0.459, 0.780)
κ
EAP 0.801
95% CI (0.678, 1.074)
Table 5: Applying model M2 to credentialing dataset. The row labelled “EAP” shows
the posterior means of the global parameters and the row labelled “95% CI” provides the
corresponding 95% credible intervals.
parameters shared by the two models are close to each other. In particular, the 95% credit
intervals overlap for each parameter. In addition, based on the posterior mean of Σ, the
correlation between the ability and speed factors is as high as 0.442. This result indicates
that test takers with higher ability tend to answer the items faster. Such a high correlation
between the two factors is not uncommon for high-stake tests. For example, Wang et al.
(2013) report a similar level of correlation between the ability and speed factors in a high-
stake computerized adaptive test, under a similar Bayesian hierarchical model but without
a cheating component. The estimated correlation between the two item-specific parameters
is 0.190. This positive correlation suggests that solving more difficult items tends to take
more time, which is consistent with our intuition.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose statistical models for the simultaneous detection of cheaters and
compromised items in tests. The proposed models can be regarded as a hybrid of factor
models and latent class models, two families of statistical models widely used in the design
and analysis of educational tests. Under the proposed framework, compound decision theory
is proposed for the detection of cheaters and compromised items under a Bayesian decision
framework. Statistical inference is carried out under a full Bayesian framework for which
MCMC algorithms are developed. The proposed method requires little prior knowledge
about the test takers and items. It is thus directly applicable to operational tests as a
monitoring tool. The proposed models are successfully applied to data from a licensure test
which suffers from the item preknowledge issue. Specifically, the proposed models accurately
detect the potential cheaters and compromised items identified by the testing program.
Despite its flexibility, usefulness, and good performance on real data, the proposed
method has some limitations. One limitation lies in its computation. It is observed that
our random scan MH-within-Gibbs algorithm can sometimes suffer from convergence issues,
which is likely due to the presence of many discrete latent variables. In fact, this is a common
issue for Gibbs algorithms for mixture models (e.g., Richardson & Green, 1997). MCMC
algorithms with better convergence performance are worth future development.
Another limitation of the proposed method is that it only models a specific type of
cheating, i.e., item preknowledge due to the leakage of items. It does not handle other types
of cheating behaviors, such as copying others’ answers, electronic transmission of data, hiring
stand-ins, and bribing test administrators to correct one’s answers. In fact, to investigate
different types of cheating behaviors, different sources of information are needed and suitable
statistical methods remain to be developed. For example, to detect copying behavior, a
statistical model is needed to characterize the similarity between the item responses from
two test takers, possibly taking into account their response process information (e.g., response
time), seat locations in a test center, etc. We leave these problems for future investigation.
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It is worth pointing out that the proposed modeling and inference framework has other
applications. In fact, the simultaneous detection of cheaters and compromised items can
be viewed as a special case of the general problem of latent differential item functioning
(DIF) analysis (Cho, Suh, & Lee, 2016; De Boeck, Cho, & Wilson, 2011) and our proposed
methods can be extended to the general problem. Latent DIF analysis is an important
complement to DIF analysis for the evaluation of test validity. Latent DIF analysis focuses
on finding unknown subsets of items on which there are latent groups of test takers who
perform differently (advantaged versus disadvantaged) after controlling for the ability to
be measured by the test. Unlike in the cheating detection problem where item differential
functioning is due to item preknowledge, there could be more causes of latent DIF, resulting
in a more complex latent structure. Besides educational testing, the proposed framework
may also be useful in the detection of fraudulent review/rating data from online shopping,
video sharing, and restaurant rating websites, where similar detection problems exist.
The current work can be further extended along several directions. First, more informa-
tion may be incorporated into the detection of cheating, such as person- and item-specific
characteristics. For example, the education record of a test taker may be powerful in pre-
dicting cheating and the exposure rate of an item is a good predictor of its leakage. Such
information may be incorporated into the current model under a structural equation mod-
eling framework that will allow covariates to be incorporated into the model to improve
its detection power. Second, the current developments can be extended to the detection of
cheating based on data from sequential administrations of a test, where each item in the
item pool may appear in multiple test administrations and a test taker may also take the
test more than once. Comparing with data from a single test administration, more infor-
mation accumulates in data from multiple administrations. In the meantime, the statistical
decision also becomes sequential. For example, the detection of a compromised item may be
formulated as a multi-stream sequential change point detection problem (Chen & Li, 2019),
where each item is associated with a change point (i.e., time point of leakage). For such a
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problem, compound decision rules balancing detection delay and false alarms need further
development.
Finally, we point out that test fairness is becoming more and more important in our edu-
cation system and methods for detecting cheating in tests are of great need. The sensitivity
and high-stakeness of the problem impose special requirements on quantitative methods for
cheating detection, including the accuracy, unbiasedness, and interpretability of the detec-
tion results. Statistical models and decision theory have a unique strength in addressing
these issues and should play a more important role.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We let p(1) < · · · < p(n) ∈ (0, 1) be all the distinct values for P (ξi = 1|Y), i = 1, ..., N ,
where n is less than or equal to N as there might be ties. We further let p(0) = 0 and
p(n+1) = 1. Then by the form of local FDR in (7), it is easy to verify that fdrζ(Y ) is a step
function of ζ, where fdrζ(Y ) is a constant in interval [p(t−1), p(t)), for any t = 1, ..., n + 1.
Therefore, fdrζ(Y ) is left continuous in ζ.
We further show that fdrζ(Y ) > fdrζ′(Y ), when ζ ∈ [p(t−1), p(t)) and ζ ′ ∈ [p(t), p(t+1)), for
any t = 1, ..., n. When t < n, we have
fdrζ′(Y ) =
∑N
i=1(1− P (ξi = 1|Y))1{P (ξi=1|Y)≥p(t+1)}∑N
i=1 1{P (ξi=1|Y)≥p(t+1)}
,
and
fdrζ(Y ) =
(∑N
i=1(1− P (ξi = 1|Y))1{P (ξi=1|Y)≥p(t+1)}
)
+
(∑N
i=1(1− p(t))1{P (ξi=1|Y)=p(t)}
)∑N
i=1 1{P (ξi=1|Y)≥p(t+1)} +
∑N
i=1 1{P (ξi=1|Y)=p(t)}
.
As 1− p(t) > 1− P (ξi = 1|Y) when P (ξi = 1|Y) ≥ p(t+1), fdrζ(Y ) > fdrζ′(Y ). When t = n,
it is easy to see that fdrζ(Y) > fdrζ′(Y) as fdrζ′(Y) = 0. This completes the proof for the
properties of fdrζ(Y ). The proof for the nondecreasing property of fnrζ(Y) is similar and
thus is omitted here.
By the left-continuity of fdrζ(Y), we have
fdrζ∗(Y;ρ)(Y) ≤ ρ.
In addition, by the construction of ζ∗(Y; ρ), ζ ′ > ζ∗(Y; ρ) for any ζ ′ 6= ζ∗(Y; ρ) also satisfying
fdrζ′(Y) ≤ ρ. Then by the nondecreasing property of fnrζ(Y), fnrζ′(Y) ≥ fnrζ∗(Y;ρ)(Y).
Therefore, ζ∗(Y; ρ) solves the optimization problem (9).
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B A Random Scan MetropolisHastings within Gibbs
Algorithm
Random scan MH-within-Gibbs MCMC algorithms are developed for the computation, where
a random scan step is taken to improve the mixing of the algorithm. The algorithm for model
M1 is described below.
Algorithm 1 (Random Scan MH-within-Gibbs Algorithm for M1).
Input: Data (Yij)N×J , initial values for model parameters Θ0i = (θ
0
i , ξ
0
i ), ∆
0
j = (β
0
j , η
0
j ),
δ0, ν01 = (pi
0
1, σ
0
11), and ν
0
2 = (pi
0
2, µ
0
1, ω
0
11), burn-in size m1, and total number of itera-
tions m2.
Iterations: In each iteration t, t = 1, 2, ...,m2, we update each of the 10 parameter
blocks, given the current parameters in the rest of the blocks. A random scan step is
taken, so that the order in which the blocks are updated is random. The update method
for each of the blocks is described below.
Block 1: Update θtis by a random walk MH step given the current parameter
values, where the random walk follows a mean zeron Gaussian distribution. Given
our model structure, the updates are independent for i = 1, ..., N , and thus can be
computed in parallel.
Block 2: Update ξtis by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. Note
that given the other parameters, ξi, i = 1, ..., N , are conditionally independent.
Therefore, ξtis are updated by sampling from N independent Bernoulli distribu-
tions.
Block 3: Update βtjs by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current
parameter values. Similar as in Step 1, the updates are independent for j =
1, ..., J .
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Block 4: Update ηtjs by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. Similar
to Step 2, ηtjs are updated by sampling from J independent Bernoulli distributions.
Block 5: Update δt by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current pa-
rameter values.
Block 6: Update pi1 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current
parameter values. Negative samples are automatically rejected.
Block 7: Update σt11 by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The
conditional distribution of σ11 is still inverse gamma,
IG
(
1 +
N
2
, 1 +
∑N
i=1(θ
t
i)
2
2
)
.
Block 8: Update pi2 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current
parameter values. Negative samples are automatically rejected.
Block 9: Update µt1 by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. This
conditional distribution is still normal,
N
(∑J
j=1 β
t
j
ωt−111
25
+ J
,
(
1
25
+
J
ωt−111
)−1)
.
Block 10: Update ωt11 by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The
conditional distribution of ω11 is still inverse gamma,
IG
(
1 +
J
2
, 1 +
∑J
j=1(β
t
j − µt1)2
2
)
.
Output: MCMC samples, Θti, ∆
t
j, δ
t, νt1, and ν
t
2, t = m1 + 1, ...,m2.
The algorithm for model M2 is described below that extends Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 (Random Scan MH-within-Gibbs Algorithm for M2).
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Input: Data (Yij)N×J and (Tij)N×J , initial values for model parameters Θ0i = (θ
0
i , ξ
0
i , τ
0
i ),
∆0j = (β
0
j , η
0
j , α
0
j ), δ
0, γ0, κ0, ν01 = (pi
0
1,Σ
0), and ν02 = (pi
0
2,µ
0,Ω0), burn-in size m1, and total
number of iterations m2.
Iterations: In each iteration t, t = 1, 2, ...,m2, we update each of the 14 parameter blocks,
given the current parameters in the rest of the blocks. A random scan step is taken, so that
the order in which the blocks are updated is random. The update method for each of the
blocks is described below.
Block 1: Update θtis by a random walk MH step given the current parameter val-
ues, where the random walk follows a mean zero Gaussian distribution. Note that the
updates are independent for i = 1, ..., N .
Block 2: Update τ ti s by a random walk MH step given the current parameter values,
where the random walk is assumed to take a Gaussian distribution. Similar to Step 1,
the updates are independent for i = 1, ..., N .
Block 3: Update ξtis by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. Note that
given the other parameters, ξi, i = 1, ..., N , are conditionally independent. Therefore,
ξtis are updated by sampling from N independent Bernoulli distributions.
Block 4: Update βtjs by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter
values. The updates are independent for j = 1, ..., J .
Block 5: Update αtjs by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter
values. The updates are independent for j = 1, ..., J .
Block 6: Update ηtjs by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. Similar to
Step 3, ηtjs are updated by sampling from J independent Bernoulli distributions.
Block 7: Update δt by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter
values.
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Block 8: Update γt by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter
values.
Block 9: Update κt by a Gibbs step. The conditional distribution of κ is still inverse
gamma,
IG
(
1 +
NJ
2
, 1 +
∑N
i=1
∑J
j=1(log(Tij)− αtj + τ ti )2
2
)
.
Block 10: Update pi1 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter
values. Negative samples are automatically rejected.
Block 11: Update Σt by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The condi-
tional distribution of Σ is still inverse Wishart,
IW
N + 3,
 2 0
0 2
+ N∑
i=1
 θti
τ ti
( θti τ ti )

Block 12: Update pi2 by a Gaussian random walk MH step given the current parameter
values. Negative samples are automatically rejected.
Block 13: Update µt by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. This condi-
tional distribution is still normal, with mean

 1/25 0
0 1/25
+ J(Ωt−1)−1

−1
(Ωt−1)−1
 J∑
j=1
 βtj
αtj

 ,
and covariance matrix

 1/25 0
0 1/25
+ J(Ωt−1)−1

−1
.
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Setting pi1 pi2 N J
S1 10% 25% 2000 200
S2 20% 50% 2000 200
S3 10% 25% 4000 400
S4 20% 50% 4000 400
Table 6: Simulation study: Four settings which differ by the proportions of cheaters and
compromised items and the sample and item sizes.
Block 14: Update Ωt by a Gibbs step given the current parameter values. The condi-
tional distribution of Ω is still inverse Wishart,
IW
J + 3,
 2 0
0 2
+ J∑
j=1
 βtj − µt1
αtj − µt2
( βtj − µt1 αtj − µt2 )
 .
Output: MCMC samples, Θti, ∆
t
j, δ
t, γt, κt, νt1, and ν
t
2,, t = m1 + 1, ...,m2.
C Simulation Study
C.1 Settings
We provide a simulation study to assess the performance of the proposed models. Our simu-
lations are designed to mimic real-life situations. In particular, we consider two combinations
of the proportions of cheaters and compromised items, including (1) pi1 = 10% and pi2 = 25%,
and (2) pi1 = 20% and pi2 = 50%, where the second setting corresponds to a more severe
situation with larger proportions of cheaters and compromised items. In addition, we con-
sider two combinations of sample size N and item size J , including (1) N = 2000, J = 200,
and (2) N = 4000, J = 400. This leads to four simulation settings, as listed in Table 6.
Among these settings, S1 is the least informative one, given the relatively smaller N and J
and the imbalance in both the test taker population and the item domain, while S4 is the
most informative setting.
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For each setting, we generate 50 independent datasets, where each dataset is generated
under modelM2 with its global parameters fixed constant across replications. In particular,
settings of the proportion parameters pi1 and pi2 are given above, the drift parameters δ and
γ are both set to be 1.2, and the rest of the global parameters are set to be the same as the
posterior means in Table 5 from the real data analysis in Section 5. For each dataset, we
apply the proposed modelsM1 andM2, whereM1 is fitted to the subset of data consisting
only of item responses.
C.2 Results
To focus on the evaluation of the proposed models and statistical decision theory, we use
the true parameters as the starting point of the MCMC algorithm. This tends to avoid the
convergence issue of the MCMC algorithm that is observed in the real data analysis. For
each dataset, we run 5,000 iterations, with the first 3,000 iterations as the burn-in. The
results are based on the posterior samples from the last 2,000 iterations.
We first examine the classification results. For each model and each simulated dataset,
we classify the test takers based on the posterior means of ξi and evaluate the performance
of the classification based on the AUC value of the corresponding ROC curve. Similarly,
the classification of the items is based on the posterior means of ηj and its quality is also
measured by the corresponding AUC value. These results are shown in Figure 9. For each of
the two models, the best classification performance is observed under the most informative
setting S4, and the worst performance is observed under the least informative setting S1. In
addition, the AUC values given by modelM2 tend to be slightly larger than those obtained
from model M1, which is likely due to that model M2 makes use of more information.
We then evaluate the proposed compound decision rules. For each dataset, we control
local FDR at levels 1%, 5%, and 10% for test takers, and control local FNR at the same
thresholds for items. Then we examine the false discovery proportion for test takers and the
false non-discovery proportion for items. The results are presented in Figures 10 and 11 for
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Figure 9: Simulation study: Overall classification performance based on the posterior means
of ξi and ηj. Panels (a) and (b) show the results under model M1 for the classifications of
test takers and items, respectively, and Panels (c) and (d) show the same plots under model
M2. Each boxplot shows the AUCs of the corresponding ROC curves from 50 independent
datasets.
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Figure 10: Simulation study: Results under model M1 on the false discovery proportions
for test takers and the false nondiscovery proportions for items when applying the proposed
compound decision rules. Panels (a) - (c) show the results for test takers when controlling
local FDR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively and Panels (d) - (f) show the results for
items when controlling local FNR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For each panel, the
corresponding threshold (1%/5%/10%) is marked using a red dashed line.
models M1 and M2, respectively. As we can see, except for the least informative setting
S1, the proposed method reasonably controls the false discovery proportion and the false
non-discovery proportion to be around or slightly below the targeted values, for test takers
and items, respectively. These proportions are not accurately controlled under setting S1,
which is likely due to the inaccurate estimation and classification under this setting.
Finally, we present results on parameter estimation. Figures 12-14 show the bias of the
posterior mean estimates for the global parameters under modelsM1 andM2, respectively.
For each global parameter in each model, we present the bias of its posterior mean estimate
by boxplot. In general, the bias tends to be around zero for all the global parameters in the
two models. In addition, for each of the two models, the parameter estimates tend to be
most accurate under setting S4 and least accurate under setting S1.
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Figure 11: Simulation study: Results under model M2 on the false discovery proportions
for test takers and the false nondiscovery proportions for items when applying the proposed
compound decision rules. Panels (a) - (c) show the results for test takers when controlling
local FDR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively and Panels (d) - (f) show the results for
items when controlling local FNR at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. For each panel, the
corresponding threshold (1%/5%/10%) is marked using a red dashed line.
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Figure 12: Simulation study: Bias of posterior mean estimate for the global parameters in
model M1. Each boxplot is based on 50 independent replications.
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Figure 13: Simulation study: Bias of posterior mean estimate for the global parameters
in model M2 that are shared with model M1. Each boxplot is based on 50 independent
replications.
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Figure 14: Simulation study: Bias of posterior mean estimate for the global parameters in
model M2 that do not appear in model M1. Each boxplot is based on 50 independent
replications.
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